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Abstract
In this paper, a secure Convolutional Neural Network classifier is pro-
posed using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). The secure classifier
provides a user with the ability to out-source the computations to a power-
ful cloud server and/or setup a server to classify inputs without providing
the model or revealing source data. To this end, a real number framework
is developed over FHE by using a fixed point format with binary digits.
This allows for real number computations for basic operators like addition,
subtraction, and multiplication but also to include secure comparisons and
max functions. Additionally, a rectified linear unit is designed and real-
ized in the framework. Experimentally, the model was verified using a
Convolutional Neural Network trained for handwritten digits. This en-
crypted implementation shows accurate results for all classification when
compared against an unencrypted implementation.
1 Introduction
Privacy and security are at the forefront and keystone problems of cloud com-
puting in today’s connected world. Cloud computing allows users to easily
outsource their computations but at the cost of losing privacy and security.
Maintain the privacy and security of data, particularly personal information,
can be prohibitive on the use of a cloud computing resource. Protecting the
data and algorithms for usage on cloud computers opens the aperture to many
more applications. The protection must provide the method to limit an at-
tacker’s ability to use the data. On a parallel tract, machine learning is an
important technology in use today. Uses of machine learning algorithms con-
tinue to increase, expand and then become vital components of today’s world.
As a concrete problem to focus on, consider a situation of needing to outsource
the classification of a Convolutional Neural Network LeCun et al. [1995] and/or
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Figure 1: Convolutional Neural Network in a Fully Homomorphic Encryption
framework
providing a classification from a Convolutional Neural Network to a user with-
out providing the model nor revealing the original source data. In this paper we
propose a model for performing a secure realization of a Convolutional Neural
Network using FHE.
In the FHE framework, a user processes their private data on an external
computationally powerful resource with a level of privacy. In an abstract view of
the process, the user encrypts their data, securely transfers it to the computing
resource, runs the process, securely transfer back the result, and then decrypts
it. Figure 1 depicts this concept in the case of using a Convolutional Neural
Network. At the start, the user encrypts their image and securely transfers the
image to the server (gray arrow). Without loss of generality, image is used to
identify the 2D object that is input to the Convolutional Neural Network. With
the encrypted image on the server, the convolution layers of the network are
run; followed by the fully connected layer. Despite the simplicity of the CNN
architecture considered in this paper, the proposed FHE model can be extended
to more complex models. It needs to be noted at this point that any structure of
a CNN can be run. After the processing is complete, the user securely transfers
the data back for decryption. Decrypting the result provides the user with the
classification results from the Convolution Neural Network. While conceptually
this process is very simple, extending the FHE to support the CNN over reals
is a nontrivial task.
Understanding what a Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme provides is
critical to understanding the hardness of the problem. The first scheme was
developed by Gentry [2009] and which provided the basic functionality for en-
crypted data processing using addition and multiplication. This research uses
a sequel scheme proposed by Gentry in 2013 Gentry et al. [2013] which sup-
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ports two possible numerical spaces: binary numbers ({0, 1}) and integers (Zq
for a modulus q which is an FHE parameter). To support any processing over
real numbers, new models are needed that represent real numbers in the FHE
framework. As the proposed model provides an approximation model for orig-
inal reals, there will be errors introduced by the representation. The primary
contributions of this research are the ability to perform a Convolutional Neural
Network while the data is encrypted using an approximation framework for real
numbers, as well as a theoretical bound on the error introduced by the frame-
work. This in turn enables the user with a trade off on time/space complexities
for accuracy or vice versa.
The basis of the FHE scheme’s security hardness is the Learning With Errors
problem by Regev [2009]. The problem hardness is equivalent to the shortest
vector problem in lattices and is considered quantum hard. This hardness re-
sult is what allows FHE to process data while encrypted. In this model, the
ciphertexts are generally represented as matrices and plaintexts are embedded
along the diagonal. A ciphertext can only be decrypted using the secret key
which is known as the trap door of the hardness problem. Within this approach,
Gentry et al. [2013] supports two plaintext spaces: binary numbers and integers
modulo a set value q. The scheme provides a single operator for binary numbers:
nand. As Wesselkamper et al. [1975] showed, nand gates can be used to create
all other binary gates. In a general set up, the gate can be computed via matrix-
matrix arithmetic I −C1 ∗C2, which requires matrix multiplication. This latter
computation is the main source of time and space complexity for the scheme.
We will employ the nand gate to compute fixed point binary numbers in FHE.
Lastly, FHE schemes have an additional capability to refresh ciphertexts. This
is will be a critical in our approach because the Learning with Errors problem
introduces noise into the ciphertext, which is sometimes characterized as er-
ror. We will refer to the Learning with Errors error as noise and the numerical
introduced by the framework as error to avoid confusion.
The Convolutional Neural Networks considered here is based by LeCun LeCun et al.
[1995] that reduces the number of trainable parameters in an equivalent fully
connected neural network. This in turn reduces the number of trainable param-
eters by creating layers that use a convolution of an image over a smaller subset
of the pixels. The individual convolutions are known as feature maps and are
equivalent to a dot product of the following form:
N∑
i=0
ci · xi, (1)
where ci is the trained constant, xi is the input, N is the entire size of the
convolution, and starting at 0 allows for a bias value to be introduced. The
computation also assumes that the two dimensional section is aligned into a
single array. As the convolutions are done as a standard neural network node,
the additional change is that the activation function is a rectified linear unit
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(ReLU):
relu(x) =
{
x if x > 0
0 otherwise
(2)
The final step of a convolution layer is subsampling via max pooling of a set
of outputs. Max pooling takes in a segment of the image and selects the max
value of the segment.
max (x1, x2, . . . , xn) (3)
A set of convolution layers is used to compute feature maps and reduce the size
to a manageable value of trainable parameters for the fully connected layer(s).
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of related work and current research in the realm of FHE, secure pro-
cessing, and machine learning. Section 3 describes the framework for realizing
Convolutional Neural Networks in FHE. Section 4 discusses the experimental
results of applying the CNN under FHE framework. Section 5 concludes this
paper along with future work.
2 Related Works
This section contains details on related works in FHE, secure processing, and
machine learning. As mentioned in the Introduction, the first FHE scheme was
developed by Gentry [2009]. This original scheme was limited to binary num-
bers and was inefficient in comparison to later schemes. Additional significant
work continued in the early 2010s time frame to improve the FHE schemes from
both functional capabilities and time/space efficiencies (see Brakerski [2012],
Brakerski et al. [2012], Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [2011]). These improve-
ments enabled processing to include the integer ring vice binary. Gentry et al.
[2013] was chosen as the FHE scheme for this research because it further im-
proved on the earlier schemes with a simpler conceptual and implementation
framework. Additional work in FHE continues, particularly with multi-key im-
plementations of multiple users (see Peikert and Shiehian [2016], Brakerski and Perlman
[2016]). While outside the scope of this paper, multi-key research has potential
uses when considering training of Convolutional Neural Networks.
FHE is not the only technique for secure processing. Paillier et al. [1999]
implemented an encryption scheme that allows for additive homomorphic op-
erations. The Paillier scheme is not an FHE scheme because Paillier’s scheme
does not allow for multiplicative homomorphic operations of two ciphertexts.
Multiple uses of Paillier have occurred over the years; including for algorithms
such as SIFT [Hsu et al., 2011] and SURF [Bai et al., 2014]. While the previous
two algorithms are signal processing related, machine learning algorithms have
been researched as well. Yu et al. [2006] implemented a privacy-preserving SVM
using secure protocol techniques. Laur et al. [2006] also implemented a crypto-
graphically private SVM using secure protocol techniques around the same time
as the previous research. Another example of encrypted machine learning clas-
sification is Bost et al. [2015], where the authors have implemented a set of
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algorithms including SVM, Naive Bayes, Decision Trees, among others; Convo-
lutional Neural Networks was not included among the others. Yang et al. [2005]
is the last example of classification for Naive Bayes with secure protocol tech-
niques. On the other side of machine learning for training the algorithm(s),
Yuan and Yu [2014] implemented a neural network training using homomorphic
encryption via the BGN scheme.
Chabanne et al. [2017] also considered the Convolutional Neural Networks
classification and FHE. In addition to using the most recent FHE scheme as
the underlying security framework, the implementations for the rectified lin-
ear unit and the max pooling nodes are implemented using approximations
(polynomials and averaging respectively) whereas this research computes the
actual functions as defined in the unencrypted domain. Gilad-Bachrach et al.
[2016] considered CNNs as well using a different FHE scheme known as YASHE
Bos et al. [2013]. This implementation is similar to Chabanne et al. [2017] and
has the same similarities and difference with this research. Two other implemen-
tations exist using FHE as part of the techniques but additionally used different
neural network implementations with binary Sanyal et al. and discretized neu-
ral networks Bourse et al. [2017]. Next, two other implementations exist in
terms of using oblivious techniques like garbled circuits. First, Liu et al. [2017]
created an oblivious neural network (called MiniONN) using garbled circuits
combined with homomorphic encryption. Second, Juvekar et al. improved on
the previous concept for a lower latency framework using a linear algebra ker-
nel in FHE to perform faster computations. Finally, Meehan et al. [2018] has
developed a concept similar to this research; however, our research shows better
performance in accuracy and run time.
Similarly, there is existing FHE research for using binary numbers to imple-
ment reals. numbers in FHE. Shortell and Shokoufandeh [2017] and Shortell and Shokoufandeh
[2018] used binary numbers in fixed point format to perform an secure FFT. We
improve upon their approach to compute real functions to perform the Convo-
lutional Neural Network in FHE.
3 CNN in FHE
This section we present the details of the Convolution Neural Network in the
FHE framework including the numerical error introduced by the implementation.
Real numbers are stored in the framework using a fixed point binary format. As
mentioned earlier, a Convolutional Neural Network is built from two different
types of layers: convolution and fully connected layers. Figure 2 depicts the
Convolutional Neural Network structure that is used in this research, which is
loosely based on the original network used in LeCun et al. [1995]. Overall, there
are 3 layers, starting with 2 convolutional layers followed by a fully connected
layer.
For the sake of illustration, we assume the input to the network is the hand-
written decimal digits in the form of a 28 × 28 image, with 10 output nodes.
The first convolution layer reduces the size to 24× 24 using a 5× 5 convolution
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Figure 2: Specific Convolutional Neural Network Used
across the image. Max pooling operates on 2× 2 segments without any overlap
causing the feature map to reduce to 12 × 12 in size. In the first layer, there
are 4 different convolutions that are run; thus the 4 feature maps outputs of the
layer. In the second layer, the number of convolutions is 15 with interactions
being allowed between the feature maps of the first layer. The second layer uses
the same control parameters as the first layer: 5× 5 convolution and 2× 2 max
pooling segments. This leads to output feature map size of 4× 4 from the layer.
With the completion of the two convolution layers, the fully connected layer
takes the 240 (15 × 4 × 4) outputs of the convolution layer and inputs them
directly into 10 output nodes of the fully connected layer. In terms of FHE, the
major components that need to be developed are the ability to do a dot product,
the ReLU, and max function.
Fixed Point Binary Format We will use the fixed point binary represen-
tation to support real-valued computations for FHE. The format is defined by
multiplying a real number, r, by a integer scaling factor, δ, and then flooring
the result. This provides an integer, z:
⌊r · δ⌋ = z. (4)
This number can be converted to binary via:
z =
n∑
i=0
bi · 2i. (5)
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Given the number in the binary format, fixed point operations in the integer
space are implemented. Basic operations including addition, subtraction, mul-
tiplication, and division can be implemented using binary gates starting from
the nand gate to other binary gates to half and full adders. While addition
and subtraction are straight forward to implement with full adders, computing
generic multiplication requires the use of Wallace Trees Wallace [1964]. We note
that division can be computed as well but this operation is not necessary for
the implementation of Convolutional Neural Network. As two’s compliment is
being used in the binary format, secure comparisons are done by examining the
bits. By subtracting two numbers, the result (in encrypted form as a single bit)
can identify equality, less than, greater than, or lack thereof. The single bit has
many uses including obfuscation. An example consider
sum = sum+ b · value. (6)
that shows conditional operations can be done by using the resultant bit (b
in this case) to add value to the sum. We will use this simple but powerful
technique to implement the rectified linear unit and the max pooling capabilities.
Encrypted Dot Product Computing a dot product within the framework
is crucial to computing the Convolutional Neural Network. A dot product can
be defined as:
m∑
i=0
ci · xi. (7)
As the fixed point binary format provides addition and multiplication, comput-
ing the dot product is straight forward. An important final note for Convolu-
tional Neural Networks is that constant multiplication can be used in the case
of client classification which the client does not need to know the parameters,
i.e. the server is not required to encrypt the parameters.
Activation Functions - ReLU Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) is required to
properly implement the Convolutional Neural Network (see Eq. 2). First we
need to determining if the input is greater than or equal to zero. If this result
is called b, then the ReLU is computed as:
res = b · x. (8)
This technique accurately computes ReLU.
Max Pooling Implementing max pooling in FHE is an operation where the
max value of the set of inputs is determined; i.e. the max function (Eq. 3).
Because a secure comparison can be used to identify the greater than of two
ciphertexts, the max function is implementable by running a loop over the inputs
and finding the max value. Using obfuscation, the update equation can be stated
as:
max = b · currentmax+!b · next (9)
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where b and !b identify which of the two values is the max (i.e. between the
currentmax and next).
Next, we estimate the magnitude of errors introduced during these compu-
tations. The main source of the error is due to the use of floor function in
Eq. 4, which increase over iterative computations. We first state the theorem
describing the error bound:
Theorem 1. Given the FHE implementation of a Convolutional Neural Net-
work with a set of convolutions layers and fully connected layers L, the imple-
mentation will result in an error of:
∆ ·
∏
i∈L
ri · di (10)
where ∆ is the initial error, ri and di are defined per each layer as follows: for
a convolution layer, ri is square root of convolution size and di is the maximum
of the sum of constants for the set of convolutions for the layer. for a fully con-
nected layer, ri is the square root of the node input size and di is the maximum
of the sum of constants among the outputs of the layer.
Individual lemmas are built up from smaller pieces to larger parts of the
Convolutional Neural Network. First we estimate the error bound on the ReLU
processing and follow that the max pooling processing. This will be followed by
the error bound on the dot product, convolutional, and fully connected layers,
respectively.
Lemma 1. Given an FHE based ReLU implementation, the computation will
not increase the error of the input.
Proof. As the ReLU computation only outputs the same value or zero, the only
error is the one at the start of the process. Thus the ReLU implementation does
not introduce any error.
Lemma 2. Given an FHE based max pooling implementation, the computation
will not increase the error of the input.
Proof. As max pooling takes in a set of values and outputs the max, the only
error is the error at the start of the process as this will be continued forward.
Thus the max pooling implementation does not introduce any error.
Lemma 3. Given an FHE based dot product implementation, the computation
will increase the error of the output value by:
∆ · √s · |c| (11)
where ∆ is the max introduced error from the inputs, s is the size of the vector,
and |c| is the magnitude of the convolution constants.
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Proof. As the constant will not have any error, the focus is on the input param-
eters. Using, √(
∂F
∂x1
δx1
)2
+ · · ·+
(
∂F
∂xn
δxn
)2
(12)
to propagate the error, the individual partial derivatives will be the individual
constants. The δxi values will be ∆ as this is the input error. This reduces the
equation to: √∑
(c2i ·∆2). (13)
Extracting ∆ from the sum, the remainder is the magnitude of the constants
multiplied by the size of the vector. Thus the error is:
∆ · √s · |c|. (14)
Lemma 4. Given the FHE implementation of the convolution layer, the com-
putation will increase the error by
∆ · √s · |c| (15)
where ∆ is the max input error per input value,
√
s is the square of the convo-
lution size, and |c| is the magnitude of the convolution constants.
Proof. To prove this lemma, it is necessary to use Lemmas 1, 2, and 3. The first
step of the convolution layer is the dot product, which will introduce an error of
∆ · |c|. This was proved by Lemma 3. The second step is the activation function
post the dot product which is an ReLU, which as Lemma 1 proved introduces
no additional error; so error is ∆ · √s · |c|. The final step is the max pooling
part. Lemma 2 proved that no additional error is introduced. Thus, the error
introduced by a single convolution layer is ∆ · √s · |c|.
Lemma 5. Given the FHE implementation of the fully connected layer, the
implementation will increase the error by
∆ · √s · |f | (16)
where ∆ is the max input error per input value,
√
s is the square of the inputs
to the layer, and |f | is the magnitude of the fully connected layer constants.
Proof. In this context, the fully connected layer is a dot product with an acti-
vation function that is linear. With ∆ as the input error, Lemma 3 proves this
error will be:
∆ · √s · |f | (17)
where |f | has been substituted for |c|. As a linear function is simply an identity
function which will not introduce any error beyond the error already included.
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Theorem 1 can be proved using the results of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
Proof. Given the structure of the Convolutional Neural Network as L, each layer
is input to the next layer. This means the error will propagate over time from
layer to layer. Lemmas 4 and 5 provide the error contributed by a single layer
for convolutions and fully connected respectively. As the error is propagated
from layer to layer, the maximum error is what should be retained to the next
layer. For the convolutional layer (Lemma 4), this will be the value |c|. For the
fully connected layer (Lemma 5), this will be the value |f |. The initial error, ∆,
can be pulled out at each layer. By designating the individual |c| and |f | as di
for the individual layers and
√
s as ri per layer, the error is increased from the
original error to the final error by the product of each individual layer. This
equates to the following equation:
∆ ·
∏
i∈L
ri · di (18)
Consider the CNN in Figure 2, the following corollary shows the specific
situation for that structure as an example of applying Theorem 1 to a specific
situation:
Corollary 1. For a CNN with 2 convolutional layers and a fully connected
layer, the total error will be:
∆ · 25 ·
√
240 · d1 · d2 · d3 (19)
where the ri values have been filled in. di values are dependent on the specific
training.
4 Experimental Results
To verify Theorem 1, an implementation of the CNN is necessary. The code
was developed in C++ using a home grown FHE implementation supported by
FFLAS-FFPACK (The FFLAS-FFPACK Group [2018]) and HDF5 (The HDF Group
[2018]). Input values are real numbers between -1 and 1. Fixed point binary
format is configured to be 32 total bits with 16 bits being the fractional space;
requiring a fixed point scale of 65536. The actual CNN used is based on the
original CNN paper LeCun et al. [1995]. Input images are handwritten numer-
ical digits from 0 to 9. The same data set as LeCun et al. [1995] was used.
Training was done offline from the FHE implementation; training was not part
of the FHE implementation. Tiny CNN (Pearlman [2018]) was used to train the
network using the original training set. Individual images from the test set were
run against the implementation. The ten outputs between unencrypted and
encrypted implementation are compared to verify the encrypted Convolution
Neural Network performs as well as the unencrypted implementation. These
results are discussed in the next paragraph.
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Using a set 20 images from the original test set, each image was encrypted,
run through the Convolutional Neural Network implementation and the classifi-
cations decrypted for analysis. All encrypted results matched the unencrypted
recommended classifications exactly. Numerical errors where contained within
the 10−3 region. On average, the individual error was 0.00085 with a standard
deviation of 0.00022. These results are aligned with Theorem 1 and Corollary 1;
clearly showing that the Convolutional Neural Network implementation success-
fully works in the encrypted domain.
Time and space complexity are an important consideration in FHE. FHE’s
basic time and space complexity have been considered inefficient. A single FHE
ciphertext is a matrix O(n˜2); this is a single bit in the fixed point binary format.
n˜2 is the size of the FHE ciphertext matrix and worse case operations are O(n˜3).
All algorithm complexity is multiplied by this.
From a space complexity perspective, there will be interim space needed
during the computations and output space for the result. Starting with the
interim space, a convolution layer has l feature maps with m2 as the individual
feature map size. Combining, this is bounded by O(l ·m2 ·f · n˜2) where f is used
for the number of fixed point binary digits. As this is for a single layer, each
layer will have different parameters. Considering l and m as the max values
from all the layers, the asymptotic bound for the interim space complexity can
include the number of layers, nl, thus O(nl · l · m2 · f · n˜2). Looking at the
output space complexity, the fully connected layer will output a set number
of classifications, designated by c. As these are individual ciphertexts of the
format, the asymptotic bound will be the combination: O(c · f · n˜2).
We note that the nand gate that is the basis of the FHE operations is
O(n˜3). For a single convolutional layer, there are l feature maps of size m2
that each have a convolution of a 5 × 5 size. The convolution is effectively 25
multiplications and additions (designated 25am). So far, this time complexity is
O(l ·m2 · (25am)). Next, the 25am needs to be converted into individual nand
gates. Multiplications in the fixed point format start with a 4f operation (and
gates of all digits) and then a log f operation of 2f full adders. Full adders need a
total of 36 nand gates. Combining these terms becomes O(f2 log f). Addition
takes f full adders; thus 36f nand gates. Thus a single layer’s asymptotic
time complexity is O(l · m2 · f2 log f · n˜3). A fully connected layer is similar
by changing to the number of classifications and the proper inputs. Becoming
O(c · m2 · f2 log f · n˜3). Considering a finite number of convolution layers, nl,
and fully connected layers, nc, the asymptotic time complexity is O(nl · l ·m2 ·
f2 log f · n˜3+nc · c ·m2 · f2 log f · n˜3). This asymptotic time complexity is worst
case because after the first layer the number m2 drops.
It is worth noting that parallel processing techniques are available to im-
prove actual running time. The current implementation used a GPU to increase
efficiency of the matrix-matrix multiplication. Additionally, the individual con-
volutions in a layer do not depend on each other, thus these can be run in
parallel. For concrete numbers, the implementation was able to compute the
classifications in two days using a four CPU desktop computer with two GPUs
and total space of about one GB. As the desktop computer used is not a real
11
cloud server, greater efficiency could be gained by using more CPUs and GPUs
to bring the two day computation down to a user tolerable time.
5 Conclusion
As has been shown in the preceding sections, Convolutional Neural Network
classifications can be computed over FHE. This enables a user to offload their
computations to a cloud computer or for a client/server model of protecting
privacy of the individual data. An open problem to be considered is potentially
using the encrypted classification for other algorithms post classification. An
argmax function is easy to implement in FHE given the work done in Section 3
(basically an extension of the max function). Argmax allows for selecting the
classification for other uses.
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